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Summary
The rapid widespread technological change and concomitant deregulation of network
industries has engendered a burgeoning demand for connection between
technologically like as well as technologically unlike, networks. The processes by
which contracts are reached and the nature of these contracts is important for the
performance of these industries.
This is a review of the state of the economic literature about interconnection. While
its focus is on telecommunications, the principles it reviews are more or less relevant
to other networks depending upon their particular characteristics. The review
considers only the pricing element of an interconnection contract, leaving other issues
such as risk sharing, transactions costs and technological agreement aside. It does not
consider the direct or political economy costs of regulation. Even so, it reveals that the
pricing issues have not been solved.
It is apparent from the review that interconnection pricing can only be appraised in the
wider context of the regulation and competition of the market as a whole. For
example, the properties of the now-famous Baumol-Willig (ECPR) rule are different
when there is a retail price cap than without it.  It is critical for the special treatment of
interconnection contracts that there are natural monopoly elements in the network.
Where these are absent or bypass is economically viable interconnection contracts will
generally not pose special competition concerns.
The survey reviews the conceptual basis of proposed regulatory schema and
measurement issues that arise in their use. In particular, it considers various price-cap
mechanisms. It does not systematically review the literature on industry and regulatory
performance under the different regulatory regimes.
Where there are natural monopoly elements, the review suggests that, for one-way
access, the two leading approaches to regulation appear to be price caps or access
price caps combined with deregulated retail tariffs. These approaches would include a
form of the Baumol-Willig rule. The review emphasises that two-way access is
characterised by both potential exclusion and potential collusion. It suggests that a
regulatory approach would seek to concentrate on keeping access charges low. Light-
handed regulation would then come in the form of deregulated retail tariffs. Taken
together, this suggests that, in a system with both one-way and two-way access, there
might be access price caps, possibly with two baskets, one for one-way access and one
for two-way access charges. At the same time, retail would be deregulated. In New
Zealand the regulatory price cap has been on household access.
The literature surveyed on private negotiations is quite thin. It suggests that where
regulators can step in as backups if private negotiations fail, it would allow regulators
to concentrate on contentious issues, while the “technical” issues would be resolved
privately. In such circumstances regulatory determination can become the common
mechanism by default.
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1. Introduction
The structure of this review reflects recent advances in the treatment of
telecommunications network access in the economics literature. In particular, recent
work emphasizes the difference between an access model and an interconnection
model or, in more accepted language, between one-way access and two-way access.
One way access (or the access model) is concerned with the provision of bottleneck
inputs by an incumbent network provider to new entrants, while two-way access (or
the interconnection model) emphasizes reciprocal access between two networks that
have to rely upon each other to terminate calls. The distinction arose for two reasons.
First, the issues to be dealt with can be entirely different. Under one-way access, the
problem is one of the provision of a monopoly input by a vertically separated or a
vertically integrated monopolist. Under two-way access, the problem is one of
coordination of an essential input between two firms in more or less symmetric
situations. Second, as competition in the telecommunications industry matures, the
two-way access problem becomes increasingly relevant.
The review therefore has two main parts, reflecting one-way access and two-way
access. Within these parts, the sections deal with pricing and negotiations. One-way
access has been the center of controversies. Ramsey prices are quite uncontroversial,
though impractical for direct implementation. After treating Ramsey prices we
therefore turn to more implementable alternatives. These include the efficient
component-pricing rule (ECPR), cost-based access charges, price caps and the
deregulation of retail prices. Following optimal pricing are regulatory approaches to
negotiations. Two-way access has been much less controversial and much less studied
than one-way access. Part 2 of the review therefore concentrates on two papers by
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a and b).
2. One-way Access
2.1.  Introduction
The one-way access problem is characterized by the presence of a vertically integrated
dominant incumbent operator (DO), who owns an upstream bottleneck input that is
essential for entrants competing with the DO in a downstream market. The upstream
input may, at the same time, be an output (“local services”) that is offered
monopolistically to endusers by the DO. This last feature, however, is not part of all
models discussed below.
2.2.  Pricing Rules
2.2.1. Optimal regulation of access and retail: Ramsey prices
Theoretically optimal interconnection prices can be determined under the Ramsey
pricing approach taken by Laffont and Tirole (1993 and 1994). This approach
simultaneously determines optimal interconnection and final goods prices, and it
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makes no a priori assumptions about demand relationships, technology and type of
competition. Rather, the assumptions vary, like in oligopoly models in general.
Depending on which assumptions are made, the approach leads to different results. In
general, these results are complex in that they have to deal with the DO’s budget
constraint, demand relationships, cost relationships and types of competition. This
complexity reflects complicated relationships that need to be dealt with and is the
price to be paid for general rather than partial optimization. For example, a model by
Masmoudi and Prothais (1994), based on Cournot competition between the entrant
and incumbent in the retail market, yields interconnection prices with the following
components:
• the marginal cost of interconnection,
• a Ramsey markup, consisting of inverse (super-) elasticities, market shares and the
type of competitive interaction,
• an interconnection charge elasticity term relating the interconnection charge to the
entrant’s output. The less elastic the demand for this output is to the
interconnection charge the higher the interconnection charge should be.
• a differential efficiency term reflecting the difference in efficiency between the
DO and the entrant in providing the final good. This term has two opposing
components: The more efficient the entrant the more it should produce relative to
the incumbent, thus the lower the interconnection price. Conversely, the more
stringent the DO’s budget constraint the less weight is given to the entrant’s
efficiency.
 
 Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) identify an expression that seems to combine
the second and third terms above. A particular role is played here by the displacement
ratio - the marginal change in the incumbent’s output over the marginal change in the
entrant’s output as a result of a marginal access price change.
 
 Also, the optimal final goods prices themselves obey a complicated markup formula.
 
 Since regulators would need a large amount of information and the ability to solve
complex conceptual problems to implement Ramsey prices directly, the question has
arisen if there are simpler ways to determine access charges (and final goods prices)
that have desirable properties. In the following sections, we discuss four possible
solutions:
• the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR),
• cost-based access charges,
• price caps for access and/or endusers,
• deregulation of enduser prices.
2.2.2. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
2.2.2.1. The simple ECPR
After a number of years, the Baumol-Willig efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR)
remains the interconnection-pricing rule most hotly discussed in the literature.1 It says
                                                
1The ECPR is widely attributed to Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983). See, however, Baumol, Ordover,
and Willig (1997), who attribute the rule to Willig (1979). For an extensive discussion, see Baumol and
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the DO should charge an interconnection price equal to the incremental resource costs
of interconnection plus the so-called “opportunity cost” of interconnection. This
opportunity cost is the foregone profit contribution of the DO by providing
interconnection to a competitor who might use interconnection to displace services
provided by the DO. Thus, the ECPR is driven by the DO’s retail prices. If (a)
interconnection and final outputs are generated in fixed proportions and if (b) the
DO’s and the entrants’ final outputs are perfect substitutes and if (c) entrants take the
DO’s price of the competing final output as given, then the opportunity cost is simply
the profit contribution or quasi-rent generated by the DO’s final output (simple
ECPR).
Distinctive for this simple ECPR is the assumption that the price for the final output is
given (and chosen optimally). The only function of competitive entry therefore
becomes to provide part of the network service at lower cost than the DO. The ECPR
is therefore a partial rule that deals only with a specific aspect of network pricing and
competition. It has nevertheless proven to be highly policy relevant. The reasons are
that, with the simple version of opportunity cost,
• it is easily understood and practiced,
• it is usually embraced by incumbents,
• It does not require a change in (regulated) prices of final services and does not
interfere with politically popular cross subsidies (and universal service policies).
2.2.2.2. New versions of the ECPR
While there have been major controversies about the ECPR in the academic literature
(notably, in the Yale Journal on Regulation and in the Antitrust Bulletin), it appears
that the academic debate has somewhat subsided. This is mostly due to the increased
rigor introduced into the analysis. The debate in the Yale Journal on Regulation and,
to some extent, in the Antitrust Bulletin has been about concrete examples rather than
about economic models. Once models are used, all assumptions have to be revealed
and, under the same assumptions, models have to reach the same results. Thus, as a
trivial matter, the ECPR can only be welfare-optimal if it yields the same result as a
model that explicitly solves for welfare-optimal access charges. This is the Ramsey
model, which generally results in access prices that differ from the simple ECPR.
Thus, the questions are
(a) under what conditions do the ECPR and Ramsey pricing coincide, 2
(b) if these conditions are not met, what is the difference in outcome between the
ECPR and Ramsey prices, and,
(c) does the ECPR represent a simple and doable way of calculating interconnection
charges?
Laffont and Tirole (1994) and Larsen (1995) have answered the first question. The
conditions they give for equivalence of the simple ECPR and Ramsey prices include:
                                                                                                                                           
Sidak, 1994, and the Winter 1994 edition of The Yale Journal on Regulation and in the Fall 1995 issue
of the Antitrust Bulletin.
2The relationship between the simple ECPR and the Ramsey approach is akin to the one between partial
and general equilibrium analysis. However, in the case of interconnection the legitimacy of partial
analysis is called into question because interactions between the relevant markets are bound to be very
strong.
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• The downstream services of the DO and the entrant(s) are perfect substitutes.
• The entrants have no market power (Bertrand competition downstream).
• The downstream industry produces at constant returns to scale.
• The benchmark pricing rule is marginal cost pricing.
• There is no bypass in the upstream market.
The second and third questions have been analyzed thoroughly by Armstrong, Doyle
and Vickers (1996). According to them, it takes a more sophisticated version of
opportunity costs for the ECPR to be theoretically attractive in a more general and
realistic setting. The resulting formula is, at the same time, much more demanding on
the regulator than the simple ECPR. The opportunity cost then needs to reflect cross
elasticities of final demands, technical substitution and types of downstream
competition (sophisticated ECPR).
It is best to discuss the ECPR in five different contexts:
1. Fully regulated retail prices of the vertically integrated DO. In this case, the
original assumptions of Baumol and Willig would hold. This is spelled out most
clearly in Baumol and Sidak (1994). This case is not particularly interesting,
because it requires originally optimal price regulation downstream. It would be
more interesting if optimal input prices came out automatically through private
negotiations, provided output prices are regulated optimally. Baumol and Sidak
(1994) maintain that this will be so and that these input prices will follow the
ECPR. However, if entrants’ costs for the competitive inputs are lower than the
DO’s costs, then the DO would be able to bargain access prices higher than under
the ECPR. Thus, imposing the ECPR would be constraining the access price
bargaining process.
2. Retail price caps with freedom of the vertically integrated DO to adjust the retail
price structure. This is hinted at in Baumol and Sidak (1994) but it is, to my
knowledge, not worked out anywhere.
3. Global price caps. This is discussed below in Section 2.2.4, based on Laffont and
Tirole (1996 and forthcoming).
4. Separate price caps for access and retail. This is currently done in the UK. It
avoids some of the problems of global price caps because it provides a more
dependable way of preventing anticompetitive behavior by the DO. However, it
reduces flexibility and may prevent fully optimal outcomes.
5. Unregulated retail prices and regulated access prices. This is analyzed in
Armstrong and Vickers (1998) and Lewis and Sappington (1999) and is discussed
below (in Section 2.2.5). The ECPR (as a partial equilibrium rule) will, under
some types of competition, ex post be satisfied by any equilibrium retail market
outcome (of a two-stage game) if access prices are regulated at any level and if
retail pricing is left to the market. For example, homogeneous Bertrand
competition will always ex post yield the ECPR (in the sense that the
interconnection charge will equal the incremental cost of interconnection plus the
foregone profit contribution). It is also plausible for some cases of heterogeneous
goods and other types of competition, since all it means is that the incumbent
would expand in the retail market up to the point where the marginal profit
contribution from more retail sales equals that from more sales to interconnectors.
In those cases the ECPR would appear as an equilibrium result of competition
rather than as a starting point of interconnection price setting by an incumbent
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with market power. However, we see below in Section 3.2.1.6 that the ECPR is
not always satisfied ex post (Economides et al., 1996).
6. The ECPR in the context of two-way access has been analyzed by Laffont, Rey
and Tirole [in the following: L-R-T] (1998a) and is discussed below in the current
section and in Part 3).
Among new results on the ECPR, two opposing ones stand out:
1. L-R-T (1998a) analyze circumstances, where the ECPR facilitates retail collusion.
2. Weisman (1999a) analyzes a dynamic setting, where the ECPR can hurt the
incumbent and can lead to zero profits.
L-R-T (1998a):
The last section of L-R-T (1998a, analyzed extensively below, in Section 3) provides
a discussion of the ECPR. In their interpretation, the ECPR is changed from a
definitive pricing rule to a price ceiling. The authors’ main result is that the ECPR
may soften price competition and may even lead to the perfectly collusive outcome.
At the same time, the paper makes clear that the ECPR is well defined only for fairly
narrow circumstances, which include a regulated incumbent and an (unregulated)
entrant. Otherwise, the definition of the ECPR is open to interpretation. L-R-T define
two types of the ECPR in addition to the one by Baumol and Willig: the marginal cost
ECPR (based on marginal rather than average incremental costs) and the ex post
opportunity cost ECPR (based on the retail price that results from entry). The former
takes care of the fact that a marginal cost based ECPR provides better incentives at the
margin than an average incremental cost based ECPR. However, the entry decision
may be distorted by using marginal costs. The latter takes care of the fact that, once
the incumbent is not regulated, the retail price, from which the efficient component
price is calculated, becomes an endogenous variable. Since theirs is a single-period
model, L-R-T have no conceptual difficulty identifying an equilibrium with that
property. In practice, however, the ECPR would have to be determined in a discrete
dynamic model with lags, leading to an adjustment process (see Weisman 1999a,
discussed below). More fundamental, once both firms are in the market and charge
each other access prices, it is no longer clear to which of them the ECPR should be
applied.
Weisman (1999a):
Weisman (1999a) moves from the conventional static framework to a dynamic
analysis of the ECPR. He shows that a relatively inefficient, but not "grossly
inefficient," vertically-integrated provider would earn positive profits in equilibrium
under marginal cost access pricing, but zero profits in equilibrium under the ECPR in
a Cournot framework. The reason is that, in successive periods, the market price
would fall because the more efficient rival(s) gain market share over the incumbent.
Each time the market price falls, so does the access charge. Thus, Weisman (1998a)
would suggest that the ECPR only benefits the (mildly inefficient) incumbent DO at
the time of entry, while the DO later loses all advantages. In contrast, Weisman
(1999b) argues that, under Bertrand competition, the ECPR is the unique access-
pricing rule that simultaneously eliminates price squeeze and discrimination
incentives. That begs the question, what would happen to Weisman (1999a) if
Bertrand competition prevailed. It turns out that, as long as the vertically integrated
provider and the rival are not equally efficient downstream, there will never exist a
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Bertrand equilibrium in which both participate in the downstream market. Hence,
under the ECPR and under Bertrand competition, either the vertically-integrated
provider is a monopolist in the downstream market in which case there is no
opportunity to exclude, or the vertically-integrated provider does not participate in the
downstream market in which case there is no incentive to exclude.  In other words, the
ECPR "solves" the exclusionary behavior problem essentially by ensuring there is no
other entity against which to discriminate.
2.2.2.3. The M-ECPR and enduser charges to complement
Sidak and Spulber (1996) have developed an ECPR with a market adjustment,
reflecting bypass opportunities of entrants. In this case, the costs of bypass for an
entrant or the stand-alone costs (whatever is smaller) would provide an upper bound
for access charges. Sidak and Spulber call the resulting rule the M-ECPR. Because it
is based on a market-adjusted retail price, the incumbent DO is not necessarily made
whole by the sum of retail and access charge revenues. Sidak and Spulber therefore
suggest adding end-user charges on outputs (of rivals only?).
Armstrong (1999) makes a related suggestion, derived from a simple optimization
model (which Sidak and Spulber fail to do). Whereas the Sidak-Spulber M-ECPR
with tax is complicated, the Armstrong approach is simpler. Armstrong considers the
purchase of unbundled network elements (UNEs). According to Armstrong, the
charge for UNEs should be set at marginal cost (to adjust optimally the quantity
purchased), while the tax on rivals’ outputs (actually, on subscribers) reflects the
profit lost by the incumbent. While the tax is levied on the input, it would be paid
independent of whether the input was purchased from the incumbent or not. Thus, the
tax has no distorting effects on bypass decisions and simply makes sure that only
efficient entry occurs. Since the model used is extremely simple, it is hard to judge if
it holds for more realistic circumstances. Armstrong also suggests such a tax to
compensate for geographic price averaging. In the case of Telecom NZ, it could be
considered as a compensation for the Kiwi share obligation.
Laffont and Tirole (forthcoming, Part II, Section 2) also note that a retail tax (i.e., a
markup on the retail price that goes to the incumbent) would be more efficient than a
markup on access, because it does not distort the entrant’s choice of bypassing the
incumbent’s network.
2.2.2.4. The relationship between the ECPR and imputation
The ECPR is related to issues of cross subsidization raised in US telecommunications
as early as the 1960s. In particular, it is related to Baumol’s burden test. Foreclosure
incentives of the DO’s simultaneous pricing in the interconnection market and in the
retail markets can be curtailed with the requirement of imputation. Imputation means
that the incumbent may not price interconnection (resale, network elements) at a
lower price to itself than to others. While internal prices, in contrast to external
transaction prices, do not usually have direct allocative effects (because internal
payments cancel each other out), they can be used as an accounting device to discover
cross-subsidies. The imputation requirement shall thus guarantee that the retail stage
is not cross-subsidized. This is the essence of the Hausman and Tardiff (1995)
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suggestion that retail prices should not be lower than the access charge plus the
incremental cost of the downstream stage.  Laffont and Tirole (1998a) equate the
imputation requirement with the ECPR. However, imputation implies upper bounds
for interconnection charges (or, minimal internal transfer prices), while the ECPR
declares these upper bounds to be optimal. If the interconnection charge equals the
efficient component price the imputed internal transfer charge cannot be smaller than
the retail price minus the (incremental) resource costs of the retail stage, meaning that
the internal transfer charge cannot be smaller than the efficient component price. If the
interconnection charge exceeded the ECP the imputed internal transfer charge would
be such that the retail stage would be cross subsidized.
Imputation is a minimum principle to make sure that the incumbent uses no
exclusionary practices.3 It still leaves the incumbent with all the benefits from
economies of scope, if any, because, under imputation, the incumbent could charge
stand-alone costs for the interconnection services and still beat competitors, who do
not benefit from economies of scope. For this it is important to remember that the
total cost of a retail service equals the stand-alone cost of the intermediate input plus
the incremental cost of the retail stage. If an entrant has no economies of scope (and
no other cost advantage over the incumbent) the entrant could not break even at an
interconnection charge equal to the incumbent’s stand-alone cost unless the
incumbent makes economic or excess profit.
If imputation is required, it makes the incumbent’s retail pricing options depend on
the level and structure of access charges. Therefore, if the incumbent wants to
implement optional pricing (nonlinear tariffs) at retail, it may have to offer nonlinear
(discriminatory) access charges (Laffont and Tirole, forthcoming, Part III, Sections 2
and 3).
2.2.3. Cost-based Prices
2.2.3.1. Rationale and approach
The third approach in the literature is to base interconnection prices plainly on costs.
In the form of marginal-cost-pricing the cost-based approach to public utility pricing
was dominant among economists for the better part of the 20th century. It is thus not
surprising that cost-based pricing resurfaces, as public utilities enter the competition
age. Instead of marginal costs, it is incremental costs that have taken center stage now.
Incremental costs have become the basis for interconnection charges in many
countries, including the UK, most of the remaining EU and the US. Incremental costs
equal marginal costs for small output changes but may differ substantially from
marginal costs if they include large output changes up to entire services or network
components. In addition, stand-alone costs play an important role. They are the costs
of a single-product entrant for providing that single service. Under a cost-based
approach the stand-alone costs of a (hypothetical) wholesale network operator would
be an upper limit for interconnection prices charged by an integrated incumbent. This
holds because prices above stand-alone costs would be unsustainable under
(hypothetical) competitive conditions. Usually, the lower limit would be incremental
                                                
3 Imputation is needed in connection with global price caps.
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costs (or short-run marginal costs). Otherwise, the interconnection service would be
cross subsidized.4 While stand-alone costs are always an upper bound for competitive
prices, there usually exist smaller upper bounds resulting from the fact that stand-
alone costs of all combinations of services/consumer groups need to be considered.
Also, the question arises, whose costs are relevant.5 Imposing stand-alone costs as an
upper-bound constraint on interconnection charges is therefore adequate, while
setting them at stand-alone costs would often be too high.6 For example, a bottleneck
is defined by the fact that duplication of the facility by an entrant would not be
economical, meaning precisely that supplying access at the entrant’s stand-alone costs
would render him not viable.
2.2.3.2. Incremental costs with markups
Arnbak et al., 1994:
As is well known, pricing at incremental costs can only be welfare optimal under
specific conditions. In particular, there should be no regulatory incentive problem and
the technology should exhibit no economies of scale and scope. Under these
assumptions, however, the interconnection problem would be trivial to begin with.
There would simply be no bottleneck. So, why have economists and regulators (for
example, in the UK and US) advocated basing interconnection pricing on incremental
costs with limited markups (usually staying below stand-alone costs)?7
The first reason is the presumption that economies of scale and scope in the
telecommunications industry are no longer very pronounced. This is the basis for
allowing competition in the first place. Econometric cost estimates are fairly
ambivalent on the prevalence of economies of scale and scope in telecommunications
networks.8 At the same time economies of scale and scope appear to prevail at least in
parts of networks. However, service-specific economies of scale can be captured in
the average incremental costs of those services. Thus, all that would be left is true
common costs that do not relate to service-specific scale. As observed by Burton,
Kaserman and Mayo (1997), in practice, the size of such common costs tends to be
overestimated.
The second reason is that interconnection provides for particularly large network
externalities (conditional upon entry of other firms) that would justify reduced
markups of interconnection prices on costs. These network externalities and the
accompanying reciprocity of calling have, in the context of two-way access, generated
proponents of a so-called “bill-and-keep” approach under which interconnection
would be implemented with zero interconnection charges. If traffic is symmetric and
                                                
4 We are here neglecting the possibility that network interconnection may efficiently be priced below
marginal/incremental costs because of network externalities or because of imperfect competition in the
retail market.
5 See Panzar (1997).
6 Similarly, calculating stand-alone costs is harder than calculating incremental costs. In particular,
stand-alone costs of various output combinations need to be calculated in order to derive the relevant
upper bound, because the DO’s revenues should not exceed stand-alone costs for any output
combination.
7See, for example, Arnbak et al. (1994), Mitchell et al. (1995), Mitchell and Vogelsang (1998).
8 See, for example, Perl and Falk (1989) or Shin and Ying (1992).
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transaction costs of interconnection charges are high bill-and-keep may be a desirable
approach.9
The third reason is that markups over marginal/incremental costs for intermediate
inputs create inefficiencies known as double marginalization. Since entrants have their
own overhead and other common costs, they have to charge a markup on top of the
interconnection prices they pay. Thus, viable competition in the retail market cannot
be of the homogeneous Bertrand type. Rather, retail competition itself entails markups
and quantity adjustments that reduce the optimal interconnection charge (possibly
below incremental cost).
The fourth reason is that high interconnection charges are the best instrument for
collusion between competing telecommunications carriers. This would, again, hold
predominantly for two-way access. However, as noted by Laffont and Tirole
(forthcoming, Part III), one-way access charges can also have competition-reducing
effects.
Fifth, high interconnection charges would invite possibly inefficient bypass
investments by entrants. This has led Sidak and Spulber (1996) to include stand-alone
costs as an upper bound in their M-ECPR.
Arnbak et al. (1994), Mitchell et al. (1995), and Mitchell and Vogelsang (1998) have
therefore suggested imposing a burden of proof on the DO. Starting out with
interconnection prices at average incremental cost of the interconnection service the
DO would have to justify any markups over and above average incremental costs.
This approach deliberately makes the regulator refrain from optimizing over the whole
set of markets, as done by Laffont and Tirole (1993 and 1994). At the same time, in
contrast to the ECPR, the final goods prices would follow retail price caps with full
rebalancing or be left to competition. The philosophy behind this approach is that
interconnection and final goods can be sufficiently separated so that (for some time)
interconnection can be regulated while the retail services produced with
interconnection as an input can be left to market competition. Since access charges at
average incremental cost do not cover common costs, markups will usually be
required. Arnbak et al. (1994) and Mitchell et al. (1995) suggest maximum markups
not to exceed the average retail markup applied by the incumbent. Laffont and Tirole
(forthcoming, Part IV, Section 2) remark that such markups should be additive and
not proportional to price, because otherwise the DO would have to increase the retail
markups to make himself whole.
Hausman and Tardiff (1995):
Hausman and Tardiff (1995) combine an ECPR type approach with cost-based
pricing. They argue that a DO’s retail service should be priced at least as high as (1)
the incremental cost of providing the service plus (2) the contribution foregone by
selling the service rather than the access service10 to competitors. This is the
                                                
9 Generally, symmetric traffic will arise independently of the relative sizes of the networks if the
characteristics of the subscribers are the same on each network.
10 Hausman and Tardiff (1995) oppose unbundled network elements (UNEs). Rather, incumbents
should only be obliged to provide services of essential facilities, for which a separate market exists.
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imputation rule. Regarding the price of the access service, they argue that the analysis
by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) on optimal taxation implies that intermediate inputs
should be priced at incremental costs. Thus, Hausman and Tardiff recommend pricing
access (as an intermediate input) at incremental cost. However, since the DO would
have joint and common network costs, they suggest a restructuring of retail tariffs
such that joint and common costs are financed by an increase in the monthly
subscriber line charge, which would act almost as a lumpsum tax.
2.2.3.3. Exclusionary practices resulting from low access rates
Cost-based access charges require markups to compensate for fixed and common
costs. If these markups are insufficient, the incumbent is under perverse incentives to
provide access at low quality or to exclude rivals (Laffont and Tirole, Part IV, Section
5]). Laffont and Tirole discuss as exclusionary categories:
• Refusals and delays of interconnection
• Raising rivals’ costs
• Lowering rivals’demand.
They suggest a rule of reason approach to such exclusionary practices because some
of the practices can actually be justified on efficiency grounds. Laffont and Tirole side
with more light-handed regulation that avoids such exclusionary practices in the first
place. At the same time, they argue that the incentive for exclusion is lower if retail
prices are regulated.
A recent set of papers deals with the incentive of vertically integrated firms to use
nonprice discrimination to disadvantage downstream rivals that have to buy an
essential upstream input from the integrated firm.11 Such nonprice discrimination is
                                                
11 Weisman (1995, 1998), Sibley and Weisman (1998a and b), Economides (1998), Reiffen (1998),
Beard, Kaserman and Mayo (1999). Weisman (1995) and Sibley and Weisman (1998a) deal with the
important problem of RBOC entry in long-distance markets and the relationship between the DO’s
market share in the access market vs. the DO’s market share in the long-distance market. In Sibley and
Weisman (1998a) the RBOC is assumed to hold an upstream monopoly for local access, which is
produced in fixed proportion to long-distance output. Local access charges are under price regulation.
When entering the downstream long-distance market, the RBOC has to obey an imputation rule (to
avoid a price squeeze) but is otherwise not regulated. In the downstream market the RBOC competes
with n-1 equal-sized firms. In the main (dynamic) model, downstream competition is in capacities and
outputs. The principal result is that the integrated upstream monopolist has no incentive to raise rivals’
costs, as long as its market share in the long-distance market is small. Eventually, however, as the
market share increases beyond a threshold level, an incentive to raise rivals’ costs arises.  If a
requirement to run long-distance services through a separate subsidiary is imposed on the upstream
monopolist, then the incentive to raise rivals’ costs may actually occur at a lower market share. Since
the monopoly access price is given through regulation, the incentive to raise rivals’ costs cannot be
expressed as an increase of the access price. Rather, the paper defines the incentive by the derivative of
the integrated firm’s profit (at its maximum) with respect to its rivals’ unit costs. This is a sensible
definition because it excludes any direct revenues or cost reductions that would otherwise be generated
from raising rivals’ costs (e.g., through deterioration of access quality to rivals).  Given this definition,
what is the intuition behind the paper’s results? Consider the two extremes of zero and 100% market
shares in the downstream market. At zero market share all profits of the RBOC come from selling
access to long-distance companies. Raising these companies’ costs (without gaining direct revenues or
saving costs from this) obviously cannot benefit the RBOC. At the other extreme, as a downstream
monopolist, the RBOC can reap the overall combined profit maximum (assuming that the regulated
access price is not exorbitantly high). In that case, it can only do worse if there are rivals. So, it will
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called “sabotage”. This literature is discussed in Mandy (forthcoming). The author
starts out from the diverse results in the theoretical literature and traces these
differences to eight different assumptions made by the different authors. The author
continues by reanalyzing the model by Economides (1998). While Economides
concludes that the vertically integrated firm always chooses to use sufficient sabotage
to foreclose the downstream market, Mandy finds that foreclosure depends on three
parameters: the access charge markup, the extent of downstream competition and the
relative inefficiency of the integrated firm in the downstream market (assuming that
there are no economies of scope benefiting the integrated firm). He identifies
combinations of these parameters that would lead to sabotage and combinations that
would not. In line with Economides (1998), if sabotage occurs it leads to the
foreclosure of all downstream rivals. Mandy then looks at the US telecommunications
market and applies his results to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Section 271,
cases of allowing RBOCs into the long-distance markets of their local customers.
Mandy finds that the markup given by interstate access prices and local network costs
is low compared to hypothetical unregulated access prices. As a result, even if RBOCs
were quite inefficient in providing long distance and if long-distance markets were
quite competitive, RBOCs would still have strong incentives for sabotage.12
2.2.3.4. Cost measurement in the US and UK
The problem with cost-based access prices is that their regulation is never “light-
handed”, because the regulator needs to measure costs, something that can be
intrusive on the regulated DO. Firms have always measured some form of their
costs.13 The measurement of economic costs of individual services or network
components (elements) in telecommunications, however, is a difficult undertaking
because economic costs are forward-looking, because of rapid technical progress and
because of economies of scale and scope, resulting from the use of long-lived assets.
There is consensus today that cost measurement requires three sources or techniques
to be used in combination. Bookkeeping is essential for providing most of the quantity
and price data for inputs and outputs. Statistical/econometric analysis is important for
establishing empirical regularities between variables. Engineering analysis is needed
to establish technical relationships that are the basis for functional forms, for example,
for economies of scale and scope and for deriving forward-looking cost data.
In the US and the UK, cost models are being used to establish universal service costs,
costs of interconnection and retail services and costs of individual network elements
and the retail function. Measurement of local network costs was pioneered by
Mitchell (1990) and is now done by all large US ILECs (incumbent local exchange
                                                                                                                                           
want to keep rivals’ costs high. In between are the interesting cases where the profits from supplying
access are traded off against the profits from selling long-distance. The relative size of these profits and
the equilibrium market shares depend on the relative efficiency of the RBOC in the long-distance stage
and on the allowed markup in the access market. Ceteris paribus, the higher the markup in the access
market and therefore the higher profit from there, the less incentive to raise rivals’ costs.
12 Another recent paper dealing with the relationship between access charges and the effects of RBOC
entry into long-distance markets is Biglaiser and DeGraba (1999).
13 See, for example Gabel and Gabel (1997) for a history of cost measurement in the US telephone
industry.
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carriers). Most of them have their own cost models, which use modules that are often
provided by Telcordia Technologies (formerly Bellcore, the common research unit of
the Bell operating companies). The advantage of these firm-specific models is that
they can, in principle, best reflect local geographic and market conditions. At the same
time, they and their data inputs are less open to outside scrutiny than models
developed and run by independent institutions. However, to the extent that firm-
specific models are used in regulatory proceedings, they are getting scrutinized by
regulators and adverse parties. For this purpose, other cost models have been
developed on behalf of (a) firms competing with the ILECs (the Hatfield Model)14, (b)
the National Association of Regulatory Utilities Commissioners (the Gabel/Kennet
Model, which forms the basis for the German cost models and for the work of Gasmi,
Laffont, and Sharkey, 1998) and (c) a mixed industry group (the Benchmark Cost
Model and its derivatives). Rather than accept one of these models as the basis for its
universal service policy the FCC constructed its own model.  All of these are so-called
proxy models that, without modifications, can be applied to all regions of the US.
Only the data input changes from locality to locality. Proxy models tend to depend on
a smaller number of data than firm-specific models for which all necessary data are
available to the ILECs (but are proprietary). They can be used to check the accuracy
and dependability of firm-specific models. In the UK, BT and an industry group (that
included BT) developed competing cost models (BT a top-down model and the
industry a bottom-up model) that were reconciled by Oftel/NERA.
In all these measurement processes, a fairly strong consensus across models and
jurisdictions emerged about the long-run incremental costs of some network elements,
switching and transport in particular. In contrast, the cost measurement for local loops
and for operating costs remains contentious. A major controversy has, in this context,
arisen around the use of options methods in evaluating the costs of network elements.
Hausman (1997)15 argues that these costs should include the options value created by
the sunk nature and natural uncertainty of investment. He sees this as a problem of
downside risks created by the fact that the buyers of access do not have the same long-
run commitment to the assets that the integrated DO has. As a result, if demand by the
entrants vanishes the assets can get stranded. Hausman calculated very high capital
costs resulting from this problem of sunk assets. In contrast, Hubbard and Lehr (1999)
emphasize the importance of balancing this downside risk by the upside potential.
However, one can argue that such upside potential can only emerge after deregulation.
Measuring costs has been an ongoing and controversial issue. Cost measurement
problems arise for a number of reasons.
• There can be conflict about the appropriate economic cost category to be
measured. The candidates are marginal costs, incremental costs, stand-alone costs
(and fully allocated costs).
• Once agreement has been reached on the cost category, a method of measurement
has to be chosen. At stake are the proper mix of bookkeeping, engineering and
                                                
14 A variant of the Hatfield model was used to estimate the effect on local telephony costs of New
Zealand’s population density vis á vis the USA, UK Australia and Sweden (see Alger, Dan, and Joanne
Leung, The Relative Costs of Telephony Across Five Countries,New Zealand Institute for the Study of
Competition and Regulation, March, 2000 (http://www.iscr.org.nz).
15 See also the comments by Rosston in the same source.
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econometric methods as well as bottom-up versus top-down and firm- or location-
specific versus general (proxy) model.
• Last, the data inputs for the models have to be collected. These can be actual
purchase and consumption data, which are often proprietary and therefore
unavailable to outside analysts, or they can be publicly available data from
statistics and the trade press.
 
 Cost measurement based on actual data appears to be naturally superior to
measurement based on estimated or average data. For that reason actual data are
usually made available to the regulator. An incumbent TO cannot complain that data
used by outsiders are incorrect but at the same time withhold the correct data. But the
stated superiority of actual data may not hold at all, for the following reasons:
• Future and efficient costs are being measured, and the actual data may reflect cost
inefficiencies. These could include waste, old technologies, excess capacities and
more.16
• The way data are presented may distort cost measurement. For example, Burton,
Kaserman and Mayo (1997) argue that regulated monopolists in the US have an
incentive to overstate common costs relative to directly attributable costs.
• Uncertainty in cost measurement can lead to two types of errors. The actual costs
may be lower than measured, leading to a windfall gain for the incumbent; or,
actual costs may be higher, burdening the incumbent.
The use of actual cost data in regulation (and long-term contracts) is known to provide
weak incentive effects. In contrast, because proxy models are built on (price and
quantity) data that are not firm specific and location specific, they can function as
benchmarks with strong incentive effects. Thus, it is not clear that, for regulatory
purposes, firm-specific models are superior to proxy models.
No good models currently exist for operating costs and for the costing of the retail
stage. In these cases, bookkeeping costs have been used at least as the starting point.
This is not so bad because, in this case, most of the costs are incurred simultaneously
with their expenses so that depreciation and valuation issues hardly arise. However,
they may still be inefficient. What could, in principle be done is the estimation of the
frontier cost function for these items from the standardized bookkeeping data of all
ILECs, although this will not generally provide certainty.
                                                
16 Kahn, Tardiff and Weisman (forthcoming) make a case for using the regulated firm’s actual costs
rather than an efficient firm standard as the basis for interconnection pricing. Their argument is that an
entrant would always want to buy access at efficient costs rather than build its own network. Thus, the
efficient firm standard does not allow the most efficient (among imperfect firms) to provide the service,
whereas the use of the firm’s actual costs would make the entrant bypass the incumbent’s facilities
whenever the incumbent is less efficient. There are two problems with this argument. First, it implies
the use of short run costs because, in the long run, all costs can be changed so that it is unclear, what
actual costs would be. Second, actual (short-run) forward-looking costs do not include sunk costs. Thus,
it is unclear if the efficient firm standard leads to higher or lower costs than the actual cost standard.
Lehman and Weisman (1999) conceptually analyze and simulate the relationship between embedded
and forward-looking costs. They conclude that, under plausible parameter values, the difference should
be small and that, therefore, the FCC’s cost models severely underestimate actual costs.
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One might think that, if at all, measurement of its network costs would Telecom NZ’s
problem. However, if interconnection charges are to be based on costs, cost
measurement becomes a general problem for the telecommunications sector.
In terms of costing, New Zealand could, in principle, learn from the US experience
about cost models. This experience could provide data. At the same time it provides
insights from the lengthy and controversial process (just like the one about the ECPR
in New Zealand provided insights for other countries). Costing itself is such a
controversial issue that the incumbent DO and the entrants are unlikely to agree on the
types of costs to be applied and on cost figures corresponding to each cost type. Thus,
it is important to find a way to bridge the gaps. What the US (and UK) experience
suggests is that the regulator should function as a mediator for cost modeling efforts
by the industry. In most countries the regulator is the only institution that can question
the DO’s cost data.17 That does not, however, preclude others, such as the entrants
and researchers, from developing alternative cost models (and their own cost data). It
also does not preclude the regulator (or competition commission) from sharing the
cost modeling efforts with the industry and experts. In order to agree on such a model,
the regulator would establish a group of experts representing the licensed
telecommunications operators, the regulatory body and independent experts.
2.2.4. Price Caps for Access and Global Price Caps
2.2.4.1. Rationale
In practice, a regulator cannot hope to capture all the effects of the Ramsey pricing
formula at the same time,18 and the sophisticated ECPR is not much more feasible.
Since the determination of costs is tedious and contentious and since it always lags
behind cost developments, it is advisable to adjust interconnection charges over time
under price-cap formulas rather than through new cost determinations.19 Price caps
solve two pricing problems. First, the adjustment formula (“RPI-X”) cuts the tie
between price and (firm-specific) cost development and thereby provides incentives
for cost reduction.20 Second, the use of a price-cap index (baskets) allows for price
rebalancing and therefore potentially relieves the regulator of the informational
burden to establish (Ramsey-) optimal price structures.21
The main issues of any price cap system are
• The setting of initial prices,
• The determination of X-factors and inflation adjustments,
• The scope of price caps and the selection of baskets,
• The determination of weights for the price-cap index.
                                                
17 These data can also be revealed and questioned in Court whether or not there is a regulatory
disclosure requirement.
18These effects do not yet include incentive effects as discussed in Laffont and Tirole (1993). The
absence of incentive effects can be justified if the incentive-pricing dichotomy holds.
19 Price adjustment formulas of similar kinds would even be advisable for privately negotiated
interconnection agreements.
20 Provided the X-factor is in fact set independently of firm performance. Often this difficult because of
the link between X, investment and quality issues.
21 This goes back to Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979).
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Setting initial prices is easier for mature markets where the going prices can be used.
This, however, does not work well for interconnection charges for which no
experience exists. Thus, a different method, such as cost-based pricing has to be used
to initiate price caps. Any distortions created by the initial method would then have to
be eliminated over time, using the freedom of adjustment allowed for by the price cap
method. The X factor and inflation adjustment should induce cost-reducing incentives
for the firm. The use of baskets restricts the firm’s ability to rebalance prices, and the
weights provide incentives to choose an efficient price structure.
Relevant for the access problem are three types of price caps, retail price caps, access
price caps and global price caps. Because we concentrate on light-handed regulation,
we will be short on retail price caps and concentrate on access price caps and global
price caps.
2.2.4.2. Retail price caps
Retail price caps should protect endusers of telecommunications services from the
abuse of market power of a DO. Once the markets are open to entry, competition
operates as a second policy instrument to constrain the DO’s behavior. The two
constraints interact, and, at any time, one or both can be binding. There also arises the
question, to what extent retail price caps influence the incentives of the DO in
providing access to its downstream competitors. Thus, should access and
interconnection be regulated along with retail price caps and, if so, what form should
such regulation take? The U.K. and US have, so far, opted for a combination of retail
and access price regulation, while New Zealand has a retail price cap on specified
basic services and no regulation of access charges.
2.2.4.3. Access price caps
Access price caps were introduced in the UK in 1997. At the time, this was seen as a
major step towards more light-handed regulation, opening the possibility to deregulate
retail services in the next price-cap round. Whether that will happen, is at this time an
open question. The regulation of access charges gives regulators control over the
competitive process in that it constrains the DO. The question is if access charge
regulation can do two things: (1) avoid exclusionary practices, including squeezing
and predatory behavior, and (2) sufficiently constrain retail prices. Assuming that the
Kiwi share stipulation in New Zealand continues, the latter can be answered in the
affirmative.
The possibility of rebalancing within the set of interconnection services also
potentially reduces the issue that interconnection is unbundled into many services
with possible economies of scale and scope within the set of interconnection services.
For example, economies of scale and scope may be imperfectly captured under the
cost-based approach with initially uniform markups for common costs. These
common-cost issues justify a separate Ramsey pricing approach within this unbundled
set. The main characteristic of this approach is that this Ramsey pricing problem can
be seen as separate from the full Ramsey pricing problem that involves the interaction
between interconnection prices and final goods prices and that has been treated in the
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global price cap approach by Laffont and Tirole (1994 and 1996). Any Ramsey
approach that restricts itself to a subset of markets is theoretically inferior to one that
includes more markets. However, this view does not take into consideration
incentives for cost reduction and for information revelation that are associated with
competition, even if it is restricted to a subset of the markets. The question is if the
beneficial effects from competition in such markets can compensate the mistake from
not including all markets under a single regulatory constraint relative to the effects
from modeling and estimation errors in solving the Ramsey problem. We are
confident that it can.
2.2.4.4. Global price caps
Global price caps differ from ordinary (retail) price caps in that they include access
charges along with retail prices under the same cap. Laffont and Tirole (1994 and
1996) have made a strong case for global price caps. They argue that making the
integrated firm choose its overall price structure under a common constraint on the
price level can align the incentive for optimal pricing in both markets. The asymmetry
created by unequal treatment of access charges and end-user prices would vanish
under global price caps. The DO would use its superior information in a welfare-
enhancing way.22 They do, however, assume that the price-cap index uses optimal
weights to begin with. In addition, Laffont and Tirole want to reduce any incentives
for anticompetitive behavior by imposing an imputation rule for access pricing in
addition to the price caps. Thus, any individual access charges would have to obey
both the price cap and the imputation rules. The reason why they suggest imputation is
not the DO’s incentive for exclusion (which means exclusion of rivals which is
profitable at the time of pricing) but rather the possibly remote danger of predation
(meaning non-profitable exclusionary pricing now in order to make excess profits
later).
Optimal weights for the price-cap index would be the correctly predicted output
levels. Making such predictions looks doable for a regulator. However, it actually
means solving the Ramsey pricing problem discussed above in Section 2.2.1. This
would be very hard and would make the use of price caps superfluous because, by
solving the problem, the regulator would have to know the Ramsey prices and
therefore could prescribe them directly. Thus, in applying global price caps one will
probably have to compromise on weights that are either quantities of past periods or
quantities projected from past trends.
In theory, global price caps provide the integrated DO with the ability and incentive to
generate Ramsey prices overall. The imputation requirement may reduce this ability,
but that would only happen in those cases where Ramsey prices imply market
foreclosure of rivals. Nevertheless, global price caps have so far been too bold for any
regulator to implement. One reason is the common knowledge that regulators cannot
commit to a specific regulatory scheme in the long run. Thus, under global price caps,
the integrated firm may use aggressive tactics against rivals, in order to keep its
                                                
22 Even if the DO itself is not fully informed about its costs, about demand and about the competitive
strategies of its rivals it would at least have the incentive to use its incentives optimally and would bear
the responsibility for being informed.
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overall market position, in case regulation changes in the future. Global price caps
may otherwise be ideal for the New Zealand setting because they imply very light-
handed regulation (even under inclusion of the Kiwi share stipulation).
2.2.5. Access prices when retail is deregulated
2.2.5.1. Armstrong and Vickers (1998)
With sufficient competition there should be no problem of deregulating retail prices
(with possible exception of some basic services for the poor and needy). Sufficient
competition could, in this case, be measured by the absence of dominant market
power of any supplier. However, due to essential inputs, the vertically integrated
incumbent is likely to be dominant in that it has power over the other suppliers. The
essential facility creates a barrier to entry. However, one can argue that access
regulation, which makes the facility available to competitors under regulated terms,
could make the retail market contestable even if the vertically integrated incumbent
maintains a dominant position in terms of its market share. Thus, deregulated retail in
connection with regulated access could be an attractive form of light regulation.
Armstrong and Vickers (1998) provide a treatment of this situation. They analyze the
case of welfare maximizing access regulation and of optimal markup regulation, using
a very simple model that builds on Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996). The
incumbent has economies of scale and scope, while the entrant has an upward-sloping
supply curve (is price taker).
Armstrong and Vickers consider two cases: perfect substitution between the entrant’s
and incumbent’s outputs and heterogeneity of the retail services. The main result
under perfect substitutability is that optimal access price regulation can lead to an
access price above or below marginal cost of access. To get this result, Armstrong and
Vickers assume a price leadership model downstream so that the entrant always sells
at his marginal costs, while the incumbent sells above marginal costs. Since there is
only one downstream price, there are two sources of inefficiency. First, the entrant
produces at a level, where its marginal cost exceeds that of the incumbent. We thus
have productive inefficiency. Second, there is a deadweight loss from the incumbent’s
retail output margin above its cost. Output-wise the two distortions go in opposite
directions. The access charge is a single instrument to correct both these
inefficiencies, leading to a compromise (or second best) outcome. Setting a low access
charge leads to more productive inefficiency by the entrant while setting a high access
charge leads to too high a monopoly markup by the incumbent.
Armstrong and Vickers also consider optimal regulation of the incumbent’s margin
between retail price and access charge. The outcome is an ex post ECPR. Optimal
access price regulation leads to higher welfare than optimal margin regulation. In
particular, consumer welfare and entrant profit are higher under optimal access charge
regulation (lower retail price and lower access charge). At the same time, optimal
margin regulation increases welfare over access charges that the incumbent would set
in the absence of any regulation. If, in the US, retail prices were deregulated, then the
provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on resale could be interpreted as
margin regulation.
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Last, Armstrong and Vickers derive optimal access charges for the case of
heterogeneous retail services. These access charges equal the sophisticated ECPR,
however, corrected by a downward adjustment factor that takes care of the sensitivity
of the retail price with respect to the access charge. Marginal cost pricing of access
turns out to be optimal for linear demands (and a nonbinding profit constraint).
Reducing the access charge would reduce the market power of the incumbent in the
downstream market but at the same time create a distortion in the consumer choice
between the two differentiated goods. Marginal cost pricing of access is then a
compromise between these two effects.
2.2.5.2. Ergas and Ralph (1997)
Ergas and Ralph (1997) take as the point of departure the Privy Council decision that
gave the ECPR legitimacy. As in the case before the Privy Council, the authors
assume a basically unregulated environment (like in New Zealand) where the
incumbent dominant operator is free to set its prices in the retail market. This is
obviously a legitimate starting point for a critique of the ECPR because Baumol and
Willig had proposed the rule in the New Zealand setting. Nevertheless, this is not the
setting in which the ECPR has been claimed to be efficient by its main proponents.
Baumol in particular only claims the efficiency for the ECPR in the presence of
Ramsey efficient retail prices. The authors then suggest more efficient alternatives to
the ECPR. These alternatives make use of the well-known superiority of nonlinear
pricing. In particular, they show that a lump sum interconnection fee, combined with
usage fees, generally improves welfare over the unregulated case. They argue that this
holds for a large range of parameter values so that improvements would occur even if
the regulator does not prescribe optimal fees. However, the authors give little
explanation and intuition as to why these alternatives are superior.
2.2.5.3. Lewis and Sappington (1999) on asymmetric information
Lewis and Sappington (1999) deal with the access pricing problem in the context of a
downstream monopolist selling access to another firm that sells a downstream
substitute to the monopolist’s downstream service. Downstream markets are not
regulated, while the access market is regulated under a scheme where the monopolist
receives a linear payment from the regulator while the regulator receives a two-part
tariff from the downstream competitor. The authors consider three cases:
1. Full information and no regulatory budget constraint. This case establishes that
(a) in general, the first-best outcome cannot be reached because the regulator
cannot differentially influence both downstream prices with only one policy
instrument, (b) for an equally efficient rival the regulator subsidizes the rival’s
variable access price. However, in my view, this subsidy could be compensated
by the fixed fee (that the authors do not consider in this context). Also, the
monopolist receives a higher variable charge than the rival pays. (c) The
optimal access price is further reduced if the downstream firm’s costs are lower
and this effect is stronger the closer substitutes the two services are. Thus, the
regulator favors the more efficient downstream firm.
2. Full information with a regulatory budget constraint. This case differs from the
previous one only if the budget constraint is binding. In this case, the variable
access charge needs to be increased in order to reduce the net subsidy. The
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authors do not deal with the ability to collect the fixed fee as the rival’s
variable profits suffer from the increase in the variable fee.23
3. Asymmetric information about the rival’s downstream costs. Two sub-cases
are considered: a public mechanism (where the monopolist learns the rival’s
costs through the revelation principle) and a confidential mechanism (where
only the regulator learns those costs). It turns out that the public mechanism is
Pareto superior to the confidential mechanism. Thus, only the results for the
public mechanism matter. They are qualitatively similar to the full information
cases, but differ between the high cost and the low cost case. If the rival has
high cost she only receives the reservation profit, while she can make an
economic (excess) profit if she has low costs.
The main normative insight of the model is that the regulator, in setting access
charges, should tilt the playing field in the direction of the more efficient downstream
firm and that this tilting should decrease in the intensity of downstream competition.
The paper is set up in the tradition of Bayesian incentive regulation. This means, the
accounting convention is used that all revenue streams flow via the regulator. Also,
this revenue stream in principle allows the regulator to provide subsidies to the firms
involved. This relates, in particular, to the wedge between prices paid by the
downstream firm for access and prices received by the upstream monopolist. One
could argue that the regulatory budget constraint could be set at zero, and then the
setup of channeling money through the regulator would be only an accounting
convention. However, the two tariffs (that is, the one received by and the one paid out
by the regulator) differ in structure. Thus, there exists no easy translation into a
framework where the regulator only sets a tariff and lets the firms transact with each
other. The question therefore is if the proposed scheme corresponds to one, where the
regulator only sets tariffs, or if this would require another mediator (such as the
independent system operator [ISO] in electricity markets).
2.2.5.4. 2.2.5.4 Burnell, Evans and Yao (1995) on bypass
Burnell Evans and Yao (BEY) examine the access pricing problem of a vertically
integrated firm that owns a network and a retail firm that competes via Cournot
competition with another retail firm. There is some product differentiation.24 The
second retail firm may build a network  that bypasses the DO’s network. There is no
regulatory intervention and, because of the threat of bypass, the vertically integrated
firm does not price the other firm off the network.25 The vertically integrated firm
behaves as a Stackelberg leader in designing a two-part tariff contract for the use of its
network taking cognisance of the ability of the second retail firm to construct a bypass
network and its output reaction function. 26
                                                
23 The authors assume the fixed fee to be a lumpsum payment.
24 Demand and retail and network cost functions are linear. Cost functions have fixed costs so there are
economies of scale.
25 This is also affected by the extent of product differentiation.
26 Quantitatively different but qualitatively similar results are obtained if the vertically integrated firm is
not a conglomerate that chooses the network contract and its retail firm’s output jointly: but instead
treats its retail arm as a distinct profit-maximising entity,  given the network contract. The same
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When the full network has to be bypassed, the vertically integrated firm has very
considerable latitude to raise the variable component of the network charge to restrict
the other retail firm’s output. In another set up, the second retail firm can partially
bypass the DO’s network and use a combination of its own and the DO’s network to
service customers. Assuming that if the second retail firm did partially bypass it
would do so by bypassing targetted network segments that are densely populated by
potential subscribers (e.g. the central business district) partial bypass disciplines the
DO to the point that the contract written is much more efficient. The paper assumes
that the contract does not differentiate between segments of the network. The
vertically integrated firm designs a contract that raises the variable component of the
network contract as much as possible while ensuring that the outside retail firm does
not bypass much of the network. This threat of bypass forces, in the examples of
BEY, a relatively efficient outcome and a contract that approximates the DO’s
network cost function. Although the assumption that there is one contract for all
segments of the network is restrictive, the paper does illustrate the strong competitive
influence of potential  bypass on an unregulated firm’s choice of a network contract.
2.3. Regulatory approaches to negotiations
The models and approaches discussed so far either assume that the regulator
prescribes access charges or that the DO sets access charges. This captures the
monopoly or bottleneck situation in the access market quite well. However, entrants
may have options other than accept an offer by the owner of an essential facility. Such
options could come from the availability of bypass or the threat of regulatory
interference. It is the latter possibility that is captured in the work of Brock and Katz
(1997) and King and Maddock (1999).
2.3.1. Brock and Katz (1997)
Under the US Telecommunications Act of 1996, interconnection agreements are in
principle reached voluntarily between carriers. Brennan (1997) establishes a tension
between the US 1996 Telecommunications Act and the FCC’s Local Competition
Order of August 1996. In particular, he feels that the Act emphasizes private
negotiations while the FCC’s order expects regulatory interference. Indeed, a lot of
regulatory intervention is anticipated in the FCC’s order. However, in my view, that
interpretation does not necessarily signal disagreement with the Act. The Act is quite
clear with respect to voluntary agreements. So, the FCC did not have to deal with
those at length. The FCC only comes into play when private parties fail to agree. That
this is a very major concern was abundantly clear at the time of the FCC’s order. At
that time, AT&T was in arbitration procedures almost everywhere in the country, and
so were Teleport and others. So, regulatory interventions (as arbitrators) were
certainly going to prevail.
                                                                                                                                           
network contract is offered to both retailers, but it is as if a contract is offered only to the non-owned
retail firm because for the network-owning firm it is simply a transfer that nets out.
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Thus, only if negotiations fail do regulators come in as arbitrators. In the latter case,
arbitration is binding. Also, negotiations are guided by the contents of the 1996 Act.
Thus, while state regulators and the FCC only come into play if the parties do not
agree, it is not surprising that (because of the new and untested provisions of the 1996
Act) arbitration was the rule rather than the exception. This is the background for the
papers by Brock (1997) and by Brock and Katz (1997). They consider the usefulness
of FCC guidelines in helping negotiations, asking three questions: (1) are guidelines
useful, (2) at what level should guidelines be imposed, and (3) do the FCC’s
guidelines conform to economic principles?
In answering the first question, Brock and Katz use insights from economic
bargaining theory. They make the case that guidelines can reduce the chance that
private negotiations will block otherwise efficient entry. They also make clear that
guidelines may actually eliminate the need for further regulatory intervention: clear
guidelines would increase the incentives of private negotiators to reach private
agreements. These conclusions coincide with the recommendations of Economides
(1995) for New Zealand, although Economides fails to make the case as clearly as
Katz.
In answering the second question, Brock and Katz make a case for federal rather than
state guidelines.
Regarding the third question the authors find that the FCC’s incremental cost pricing
rules were not based on full economic analysis. They find that this is more crucial for
unbundled network elements (UNEs) than for call termination.
Thus, the evaluation of guidelines hinges on their contents and on the credibility of
the regulatory agency that administers them.
2.3.2. King and Maddock (1999)
While the background of King and Maddock (1999) is the Australian institutional
setting, the article is actually a strongly simplified theoretical bargaining model of
access pricing that could apply to any jurisdiction. The main assumptions are the
following:
• There is a bottleneck facility controlled by the incumbent. In the absence of an
access agreement with a (single) entrant the incumbent would hold a monopoly in
the market downstream of the bottleneck facility.
• The incumbent and entrant negotiate about an access charge. There is no retail
regulation. The access charge therefore determines the size and division of total
industry profits.
• The authors do not specify how competition in the downstream market plays itself
out. In principle, the two firms could collude here. Thus, the access price is not
necessarily linear. Rather, there could be side payments in the form of fixed fees.
• In case the firms do not reach an agreement, either of them or both can call for
regulatory arbitration, which is binding. In particular, King and Maddock assume
that in private negotiations the outcome always yields monopoly profits, while
regulatory arbitration leads to a reduction in total profits.
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• The model follows the framework pioneered by Rubinstein (1982), where players
make alternating offers. Since these offers take time, the effect of not reaching an
agreement now is that the status quo continues for another period. The length of
such periods and the applicable discount rates therefore play a major role.
 
 It is clear that, under the assumptions made, the incumbent would always stall
negotiations if regulatory arbitration were not available. That way, the incumbent
would continue to earn monopoly profits.27 In the presence of such arbitration,
however, the incumbent has to weigh continuation of monopoly profit for another
period (until the arbitration decision has been made) and the regulated outcome
thereafter against sharing the monopoly profit with the entrant immediately. This
tradeoff depends largely on the profit reduction of the incumbent under arbitration, the
profit of the entrant under arbitration and the (common) discount rate. Although it is
clear that the entrant and incumbent both have an interest in avoiding arbitration, a
dispute may still come about.
 
 King and Maddock get the following results:
 
• If players are patient (have low discount rates, or if periods are short) the
equilibrium profits form a large range. This range is bounded between the
arbitration outcome and a negotiated outcome (with total monopoly profit) in
which the incumbent concedes to the entrant the discounted profit that the entrant
would receive under arbitration.
 
• If players are impatient the entrant will always seek arbitration, when it is his turn.
Now, we get two possible outcomes, depending on the level of impatience. If
players are very impatient there will be a unique negotiated outcome, where the
incumbent will just concede to the entrant the discounted profits under arbitration.
If players have an intermediate level of impatience, the entrant will concede to the
incumbent only what the incumbent would have gotten under arbitration (that is,
monopoly profit for one period and the regulated profit thereafter). Note that these
results are both gained without arbitration actually taking place. Note also that the
regulator could switch the outcome from one to the other by announcing a longer
or shorter time for the arbitration.
 
 Note that arbitration will occur only if players are sufficiently patient. In this case,
there could be many equilibria so that arbitration is only one of many possible
outcomes.
 
 King and Maddock add three procedural options to their model. All of these would be
imposed in an effort to reduce the amount of arbitration.
 The regulator could
• Introduce last chance bargaining. Under this the arbitration decision would be
made only after the parties engaged in further bargaining. King and Maddock find
that the outcome in this case depends crucially on who makes the last offer inside
the waiting period (that is, if there is an even or odd number of periods inside the
                                                
 27 This point is also made by Katz (1997).
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waiting period). If the incumbent makes the last offer the entrant is favored and,
vice versa, the incumbent is favored by the last offer of the entrant.
• Act only if the parties have already bargained long enough. This is a requirement
under the US Telecommunications Act of 1996. Again, the outcome depends
crucially on who makes the last offer. However, the incumbent will always wait to
make an agreement until right before the minimum bargaining period ends.
Interestingly, in the US few agreements (under the 1996 Act) were reached
voluntarily. Those few voluntary agreements involved comparatively small
entrants with substantial two-way traffic. One can speculate that regulatory
arbitrage was favored, first, because arbitration was based on a new and untried
law. Thus, sufficient uncertainty existed about the outcome under arbitration.
Second, under the 1996 Act, the most favored nation principle applies. Thus, early
agreements would benefit from a head start and from later adjustment if other
entrants got a better deal through arbitration. This probably made small entrants
free ride on the larger ones.
• Make biased decisions that either favor or punish the party seeking arbitration,
while simultaneously punishing or favoring the other party. This makes the threat
outcome of arbitration more punishing for the other party and thus favors
voluntary outcomes.
Like all very stylized models, those by King and Maddock (1999) contain some
simplifying assumptions that seem to go against essential properties of a situation. In
particular, it appears that the absence of antitrust enforcement is at odds with the
relevant empirical facts. However, the assumption may not be so bad. First, it
substantially facilitates the analysis because it restricts the negotiated outcome to a
division of a unique monopoly profit. With antitrust enforcement, the authors would
have had to model the possible types of competition, resulting in a myriad of possible
outcomes. Second, the qualitative insights are unlikely to change, because any type of
competition can be expressed in terms of a profit distribution. Third, while the
negotiations are adversary, the parties would have incentives to agree on keeping
industry profits high. This is precisely what comes out when these firms do not go to
arbitration. It does, however, mean that all types of access prices have to be
admissible.
3. Two-way Access
3.1.  Issues: Collusion versus exclusion
Two-way access has been around for a long time in the form of international calling
arrangements between countries (settlements) and the arrangements between adjacent
local exchange companies in the U.S..28 These involve carriers that do not compete
with each other and are therefore quite different from the situations of interest to
Telecom NZ. The absence of competition can lead to extreme double marginalization
problems, because the carriers can charge monopoly access charges from each other
and then put a monopoly margin on top when they sell their output. In contrast, the
two-way access problems that Telecom NZ is concerned with occur between
                                                
28 In the US, this has often led to pooling arrangements. See Lehman and Weisman (1996).
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competing carriers that operate at the same level of integration and offer local and
long-distance services. The issues arising in this context are collusion and exclusion.
Collusion means seeking joint benefits, while exclusion means hurting and being hurt
by the other party.
The current contentious relationships between incumbent DOs and entrants do not
raise the imminent specter of collusion. The telecommunications sector is probably
subject to most of the same collusion problems as other concentrated industries. On
top of those, however, telecommunications may become particularly prone to
collusion for reasons similar to those that favor integration of telecommunications
companies. Besides competing with each other, telecommunications firms have to
collaborate with each other in the form of interconnection, provision of unbundled
network elements and in the resale of services. All these collaborations occur, in
principle, between all competing firms in the industry and on an ongoing basis. The
collaboration is also sufficiently complex that it requires close relationships. Such
collaboration between multiproduct firms in the form of reciprocal dealings has, in the
past, been viewed as one of the reasons for reduced competition in some other sectors,
such as the oil industry. Beyond the international settlements process, we have little
experience in this respect with the telecommunications industry. Due to the
antagonistic political process that jump-starts competition, initially the problem of
collusion will be minor. However, over time it may well increase significantly. This is
further enhanced by merger activities among new competitors in local networks. Such
consolidation could be more of a problem in New Zealand than in the US, since in
New Zealand the number of interacting competitors is likely to remain smaller.
Collusion then need not occur in explicit forms but will be more subtle and therefore
less subject to antitrust scrutiny. The question then arises if regulatory intermediation
in collaborations between competitors would reduce the incentive to collude.
3.2. Interconnection pricing models
3.2.1. Laffont, Rey and Tirole [L-R-T](1998a and 1998b) and related
work
3.2.1.1. Model assumptions
The literature on interconnection pricing (or access pricing) has largely focused on
bottleneck situations in which at least one of the participating firms is regulated. The
typical situation in this literature is that of a vertically integrated monopolist who
experiences competitive entry by a firm that requires an essential input from the
monopolist. Usually, regulation of the DO relates to final output prices or the price of
the essential input or both. This describes the past situation in local telephone markets
in the US and UK or in electricity markets quite well. However, these markets are
quickly progressing to a more competitive state where the distinction between
incumbent DO and entrants gets blurred and where deregulation has already been
implemented (telephony in New Zealand) or is on the horizon (electricity in the UK
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and the US). It is these markets of networks with more mature competition that L-R-T
(1998a and b)29 address.
The authors set up a model that might best fit local services in the telecommunications
industry. They assume two competing firms that own networks and supply individual
consumers who each subscribe to only one network (following from a discrete choice
model). Thus, consumers consecutively have to decide on which network to subscribe
to and how much to call. If consumers want to communicate with someone on the
other network interconnection between the networks is required. Although they could
play a major role in such networks, the usual telephone network externalities and call
externalities (based on incoming calls) are not specifically modeled. Rather, consumer
utility only depends on outgoing calls. This has the advantage that any “network
externalities” discovered in the models described by the two papers are more easily
identified as being of a different kind. Additional consumer-related assumptions
include
• that networks are differentiated in a Hotelling framework, meaning that consumer
preferences are spread along a line and networks make product differentiation
choices by locating at a point on the line. In this case, they are assumed to be
located at the opposite extreme points of the line. The degree of substitutability
between  networks is given by the size of transport costs on the line.
• that there are isotropic calling patterns, meaning that, at the same calling charge,
the inbound and outbound calls are balanced.
• L-R-T allow users to subscribe to only one network.
Cost structures of full coverage networks are assumed to be the same. Except for
subscriber-specific fixed costs, there are no network size related or density related
production economies. The two L-R-T papers assume unregulated retail markets,
while the access market may or may not be regulated.
3.2.1.2. Symmetric, full coverage networks, and linear pricing:
In the first part of L-R-T (1998a) interconnection charges are assumed to be
reciprocal by law. The authors first establish a Ramsey-pricing solution as a
benchmark. The outcome here is that the access charge is below marginal costs,
because, due to imperfect retail competition firms have positive markups in the retail
market. This result is unambiguous because of constant returns to scale. Under
economies of scale, Ramsey access charges could be below or above marginal costs,
depending on the degree of scale economies and the size of the retail markup.
L-R-T then check the existence of competitive equilibria, derive equilibrium retail
prices and undertake comparative statics with respect to two parameters: the access
price and the degree of substitution between the networks. Their main results here are
the following:
• Existence of a (pure strategy) equilibrium requires the access price and/or the
substitutability between networks not to be too high.30
• In equilibrium, retail prices are symmetric.
                                                
29 See also Laffont and Tirole (forthcoming), where these articles are explained in more intuitive ways.
30  L-R-T give no precise indication what is too high substitutability.
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• The equilibrium retail price increases with the access price.
• The equilibrium retail price decreases with the substitutability between networks
and converges against the Ramsey price (if, at the same time, the access price is
low enough to allow for existence of the equilibrium). This is a typical result of
the Bertrand pricing assumption.
• The firms agree on access charges so that joint profits are maximized.31
 
 To understand the last outcome consider the effects of access charges above marginal
costs. First, the access charge above marginal costs raises each firm’s marginal costs
for outgoing calls, thus increasing the optimal resale price. Thus, isotropic (balanced)
calling patterns do not imply an indifference to the size of the (reciprocal) access
charges. The reason is that the balanced outcome is an equilibrium, but would not
result if retail prices differed. Second, lowering the retail price has two effects: It lures
away subscribers from the other network; and it increases the call volume of given
subscribers. Lowering the retail price therefore has a negative effect on access profits.
Another way of seeing this is that, at an access charge above the marginal cost of
access, the marginal costs faced by a firm for an outgoing call increases in the other
firm’s market share. This “endogenous marginal cost effect” is due to the increased
share of off-net calls. It further lessens the incentive to compete at retail. Another
interpretation of the same phenomenon is given by Armstrong (1998), whose paper is
very similar to the first part of L-R-T (1998a). In Armstrong’s interpretation, when
access charges are set according to the collusive equilibrium rule, then firms have no
incentive to deviate from the collusive retail price because the gain in profits from
undercutting the rival is just compensated by the increase in access payments needed
for the increased number of calls going to the other network (and the reduced number
coming from there).
 
 In the case of nonreciprocal access charges the authors apply a two-stage game
approach in which both access charges and retail prices are determined
noncooperatively. In the noncooperative framework the access charges in both
directions are independent of each other. They therefore do not act as a coordinating
device.32 Rather, they lead to the problem of double marginalization. This is the more
severe, the less substitutable the networks are for each other. Armstrong (1998)
observes that these noncooperatively chosen access charges will be higher than the
cooperatively chosen reciprocal charges.  L-R-T’s additional main results in the
noncooperative case are:
• If substitutability is sufficiently low there exists a symmetric equilibrium in
access charges and retail prices, involving double marginalization. Thus,
reciprocal access charges are an equlibrium outcome in this model!
• As long as the equilibrium exists, higher substitutability implies a lower
equilibrium retail price, while the effect of higher substitutability on the
equilibrium access price is ambiguous.
                                                
 31 Noncooperatively determined access charges may even lead to higher than monopoly retail prices.
 32 Recall that this is a one shot game. The authors therefore do not ask if collusion could arise in a
repeated game framework.
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3.2.1.3. Competition between large incumbent and small entrant
Next, the authors look at a situation involving an incumbent firm with full coverage
and an entrant, who can choose its level of coverage. The incumbent’s overall market
share is now the average between its monopoly in the area not covered by the entrant
and its market share in the remaining, competitive (= duopoly) area.33 A crucial
assumption in this model is the absence of retail price discrimination between the two
areas and between on-network and off-network calls.34 The main results here are:
• If the access price is mandated at some low rate close to marginal costs:
• The entrant undercuts the incumbent in the retail price and incurs an access
charge deficit.
• The entrant underinvests in coverage in order to soften price competition
(entrant as puppy dog).
• The authors only sketch an equilibrium determination of the access price through
bargaining. They suggest that:
• The incumbent may use the access price (or the bargaining process) to
corner the market and maintain a monopoly.
• The entrant may overinvest in coverage in order to keep the access price
down.
The rationale for these results comes directly from the assumption that the incumbent
cannot price discriminate geographically by charging a lower price in the duopoly area
than in the monopoly area. The aggressiveness of the incumbent’s pricing behavior is
therefore linked to the size of the entrant’s coverage. If the entrant covers only a small
territory, the incumbent is pricing less aggressively than if the entrant’s territory is
large. The reason is that the incumbent would like to exploit its monopoly position in
its captive area. Hence, the entrant’s market share in the duopoly area is going to be
larger if that area is small than if it is large.
The entrant’s strategy very much depends on the rules for determining price and
conditions of access (call termination). Because the entrant prices more aggressively
than the incumbent does, the entrant wants low termination charges. At the same time,
the entrant may also want to use the termination charge as a collusive device. These
incentives combine with the default rule on access in case negotiations fail. If the
default rule is “no interconnection” the entrant has incentives to invest in high
coverage so that the incumbent would be more interested in interconnection. If the
default rule is guaranteed interconnection at a maximum price the entrant will
underinvest in coverage, in order to soften the incumbent’s retail pricing behavior. If
expanded coverage by the entrant is a credible possibility, the incumbent may
therefore actually prefer mandated, low price access to a default rule of no access or
high priced access.
In a related approach, Armstrong (1998) considers a large incumbent and a small
entrant, using the assumption that consumers prefer the incumbent over the entrant so
that, at the same retail prices, the entrant’s market share would vanish. It is then clear
that the entrant can only survive at lower prices. This implies (with isotropic calling
                                                
33 In my view, the area does not have to be interpreted in a geographic sense. It could also refer to types
of customers. Thus, the entrant could be restricted to large business users.
34 Price discrimination is covered in L-R-T (1998b).
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patterns) that the entrant incurs an access charge deficit with the incumbent. As a
result, the entrant will prefer lower access charges than the incumbent. Armstrong
shows that the access pricing problem in this case is similar to that of one-way access,
interpreting the entrant’s demand for access as its net demand (or access charge
deficit).
3.2.1.4. Nonlinear pricing
The last two-way access model developed in L-R-T (1998a) concerns retail
competition in nonlinear pricing for two full coverage networks. Since firms are fully
informed about consumer utility (there is only one type of consumer), they can
achieve optimum (= perfectly discriminating) outcomes through two-part tariffs. Two-
part tariffs make sense because of customer-specific fixed costs. The main results are:
• Equlibrium exists if access prices and substitutability are not too high.
• Such an equilibium is symmetric.
• Optimal usage fees (for endusers) are firm specific marginal costs (that include
access charges.
• Optimal fixed fees equal marginal costs of adding a customer (net of the net
access charge revenue generated) plus a markup reflecting substitutability.
• The profit in equilibrium is independent of the access charge. Thus, the access
charge creates no incentive to collude.
The last result comes about because the firm uses the fixed fee to take away
subscribers from the other network, while the usage fee stays constant to balance calls
between the networks. Thus, both firms use the two parts of the retail tariffs as
distinct instruments, one to influence market share and the other to influence calling
volume.
The assumption of homogeneous subscribers is responsible for the clarity of the two-
part tariff outcome. Had subscribers been heterogeneous, usage prices would
optimally depart from marginal costs. The collusive impact of high access charges
would therefore not be fully eliminated (Armstrong, 1998).
3.2.1.5. Discriminatory pricing (L-R-T, 1998b)
The new item over L-R-T (1998a) is that networks can discriminate between calls that
terminate within the call originating network  (on-network calls) and those that
terminate on the other network (off-network calls). Such discrimination has been
common in the US telephone industry (originally introduced as “Friends and Family”
by MCI in the 1980s).
The authors first establish that price discrimination of this kind has no value in the
benchmark Ramsey optimum and that both networks attain the same market share
(and full coverage). Price discrimination is not welfare optimal because it leads to
different marginal rates of substitution between on-net and off-net calls. The authors
then determine existence of market equilibria and market shares in equilibrium. This
is a fairly tricky endeavor because the market share of a firm depends on the
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expectation of consumers about how market shares will be distributed in equilibrium.
Multiple equilibria are therefore possible (but L-R-T argue that is not a major issue).
Next, equilibrium prices are derived. The existence of equlibrium depends (as in
1998a) on the access price and the substitutability between networks not being too
high. In symmetric equilibrium the on-net retail price decreases with substitutability
and with the access price. The off-net price is proportional to the on-net price, where
the proportionality factor itself rises with the access charge. Also, if substitutability is
sufficiently small, the off-net price increases in the access charge. Again, the intuition
is that through a low on-network price you encourage on-network calling, whereas
with a high off-network price you discourage off-network calling.
The main insight of L-R-T (1998b) is to show the existence and working of price-
induced network externalities. Belonging to a larger network allows a consumer to do
more lower priced on-network calls. Thus, a high access charge that leads to a high
off-network retail price hurts a network with a small market share. A full coverage
incumbent can squeeze a small coverage entrant through a high access price. This is
important for access charge regulation and for regulatory permission of price
discrimination in the retail market. Another, not too surprising insight of the paper is
that banning price discrimination may hurt social welfare. This holds for networks
that are poor substitutes and for positive markups of access charges over access costs.
In this model, an increase in access charge may actually increase retail competition,
because an access charge increase drives a wedge between the marginal cost of an off-
net call as opposed to an on-net call. High access charges therefore are not necessarily
a good collusion device. Rather they induce firms to increase their market shares in
order to have more on-network calls (avoiding the access charge). In a second best
sense, therefore, the price discrimination can improve welfare by reducing double
markups (on access and retail) if networks are sufficiently differentiated. This will
happen, because the high off-net price will not have many users. The problem is that,
at the same time, the incumbent could foreclose a small entrant. This problem
suggests that a regulator would want to forbid such price discrimination, when
competition is in its infancy, while such price discrimination would be advisable, once
entrants are viable (having large coverage sunk networks).
3.2.1.6. Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996)
Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996) have an approach similar to L-R-T (1998a).
However, their main model differs from L-R-T by the assumption that consumers first
choose, which network to subscribe to. Then networks set their prices and then
subscribers make their consumption decision. While this sequence seems to reflect the
reality that subscription decisions are more long term than usage decisions, it has the
unrealistic implication that networks become monopolists with respect to the usage
decision of subscribers. As a result, the model is close to one on international
settlements. This means that there will always be monopoly pricing for usage.
However, if access charges (for termination of calls) are determined unilaterally there
will, in addition, be a double markup problem, which vanishes if reciprocity is
imposed as a regulatory rule. The authors also look at first mover advantages
(Stackelberg leader in access charges), which, again, are severe for the case of
independent setting of access charges, while first-mover advantages disappear under
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reciprocity. The conclusion on reciprocal access charges is thus in stark contrast to L-
R-T. The authors also show that the ECPR does not hold ex post under independent
setting of access charges by a firm with first mover advantages.
3.2.1.7. Carter and Wright (1999)
The paper by Carter and Wright (1999) is in many respects a simplified version of L-
R-T (1998a). They provide some additional insights. For example, they show that,
even if a regulator imposes marginal cost pricing at retail but regulates access charges
only by requiring reciprocity, the networks can sustain monopoly profits by agreeing
on high access charges. Thus, Carter and Wright emphasize the fact that negotiation
over access charges leads to collusion that would be forbidden in the retail market. As
a consequence, Carter and Wright recommend regulation of access charges rather than
regulation of retail prices.
3.2.1.8. General critique of L-R-T (1998a and b)
The L-R-T (1998a and b) models of two-way access suggest that reciprocal access
charges may be perfect tools for collusion. However, several features counterbalance
the collusive effects:
• incentives to build market shares (tough competition that destroys equilibria),
• the use of two-part tariffs at retail,
• discrimination between on-net and off-net calls.
• In addition, Laffont and Tirole (forthcoming) suggest that the collusion incentive
would be reduced if firms could subsidize their subscribers for incoming calls.
The intuition here is that firms would want to do that if access charges exceed
marginal costs, making calls coming from the other network profitable.
 
 The rationale for the last three mechanisms for reducing collusion is that they
introduce a second price as an instrument that undermines collusion. At the same
time, it is well known that these mechanisms all work imperfectly, because firms do
not have full information about the customers’ demands. Thus, the incentive to
collude may override the effects of these mechanisms.
 
 Like all theoretical analysis, L-R-T use simplifying assumptions and get some
restrictive results. The following observations concern the generality of the model:
 
 No economies of scale. L-R-T use a constant returns to scale framework. This
assumption allows them to concentrate on issues that are not cost driven. However,
some of the results are driven by this assumption. L-R-T indicate how those results
would change under economies of scale. In my view, the assumption of economies of
scale would not change the main qualitative results.
 
 Nonexistence of equilibria. Nonexistence of equilibria (and, to some extent, the
existence of multiple equilibria) is a major result of the papers. It does not become
clear, how severe and common such nonexistence would be. The reason for
nonexistence is that close substitutability and high access charges cannot hold in
equilibrium, because high access charges imply a high retail price. However, at high
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substitutability a firm can undercut the other in the retail market and get all customers,
thus bypassing the access charge. This is a problem with Bertrand models.
 
 Is nonexistence the result of important economic phenomenon or just a modeling
problem (that could be solved through the admission of mixed strategy equilibria)? L-
R-T argue that it the result of an economic phenomenon they call “endogenous
marginal cost effect.” By this they mean that, if access charges exceed the marginal
cost of access, then the marginal costs of an outgoing call (on average) increases in
the other firm’s market share, because of the increased likelihood that it will be an
off-network call. However, at high substitutability, market share can be gained easily
by slightly undercutting the price charged by the other network. The problem with
nonexistence of equilibria is that one cannot learn from the model, what actually will
happen. L-R-T suggest an unstable situation. This, according to their model, could
well prevail if networks are close substitutes.
 
 One shot Bertrand model. A related problem with the model is that it uses a one-shot
Bertrand approach. The telecommunications industry is characterized by long-lived
sunk assets. Then it does not make sense to have a model where price cannot be
adjusted after capacity is set. Price is usually a short term variable. Our discussion of
Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996) suggests that allowing the firm to set price
last will change the outcome, though not in a more convincing way. The question then
is if a Cournot model would be more realistic.
 
 Dependence on high demand elasticity. L-R-T use a constant demand elasticity
framework. It is well known that, in such a case, demand has to be elastic in order to
allow for finite collusive prices. Empirically, telecommunications demand tends to be
inelastic, however. In my view, the high demand elasticity is harmless, at least for the
models that yield collusion. They would have even stronger collusive implications (in
the sense that markups would be even higher) with inelastic demand.
 
 Hotelling assumption. Hotelling product differentiation is not a completely general
model. For example, it does not capture very well perceived quality differences
(incumbency advantages) that hold for essentially all consumers. Although the
Hotelling model may not ideally characterize product differentiation in
telecommunications, it so far is the only game in town for the main results on
collusion. Similar results are now available from Armstrong (1998), Buehler (1999)
and Carter and Wright (1999), who use either the same or only slightly different
demand frameworks. Armstrong makes market shares depend on the difference of
utility gained by subscribing to one network rather than the other. Armstrong’s
contains the Hotelling framework as a special case. In the case of Buehler, demand
functions for the two networks depend on randomly distributed tastes (logit random
utility model). Buehler does not discuss this assumption. So, it is hard to judge. Carter
and Wright use a market share function for network subscription of the form s(p1,p2)
that also reduces to the Hotelling model as a special case. Brennan (1997), using a
homogeneous goods model with Bertrand competition, provides some nice insights on
the incentive to collude and on the effects of free entry through which excess profits
are competed away while the inefficiencies created by collusion are maintained.
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 Isotropic (balanced) calling patterns. In the US, CLECs (competitive local exchange
carriers) were initially afraid that they would have much more outgoing than incoming
traffic (due to multiple lines of business customers, who would use the CLECs for
their outgoing traffic, but keep their ILEC (incumbent local exchange carriers) lines
for incoming traffic). However, due to the Internet, the actual calling patterns were
often reversed. These experiences suggest that balanced calling patterns are
unrealistic. Dessein (1998), building on L-R-T (1998a and b), shows that violation of
the balanced traffic assumption strengthens some and weakens some of the L-R-T
conclusions. He assumes that there are high volume customers with more outgoing
than incoming calls and low volume customers with more incoming than outgoing
calls (at the same prices). The high volume customers are increasing usage more for a
given price reduction than the low volume customers (higher price elasticity). As a
result of this (sensible) set of assumptions:
• The endogenous marginal cost effect is strengthened and an access charge above
marginal costs has an even larger collusive effect than in the L-R-T model for
linear prices. At the same time, large users are attractive as subscribers, so that
competition for them is increased.
• The L-R-T result on two-part tariffs (and other non-linear prices), however, is
confirmed.
• In the case of partial coverage by an entrant, under linear pricing, the incumbent
can exclude the entrant and enjoy monopoly profit. Under nonlinear pricing, the
entrant can avoid such fate by specializing on target groups with special calling
patterns and offering them low fixed charges and high usage charges, thus creating
an access charge surplus with the incumbent.
Overall, L-R-T (1999a and b) are ambitious papers, containing a lot of propositions
and insights about two-way access pricing. The main questionable assumption appears
to be the Bertrand pricing approach, which leads to nonexistence of equilibria in cases
of close substitutability between the networks. The results on incentives for collusion
created by reciprocal pricing is shared by other models and appears to be quite robust.
3.2.2. Other models
3.2.2.1. Bill and keep (peering)
In the past, the interconnection arrangements between Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) were of the bill-and-keep kind, meaning that reciprocal services were provided
free of charge. These so-called “peering arrangements” have induced some
economists, such as Brock (1995) to call for similar arrangements among (competing)
telecommunications network providers (ILECs and CLECs in particular). More
recently, the Internet arrangements have changed. Now, peering arrangements without
charge only continue between core ISPs, while non-core ISPs have to pay. The core
ISPs have negotiated separate interconnection agreements on a one-to-one basis.
These agreements make core ISPs accept traffic from each other for their own
customers, but that does not include transit traffic to other core ISPs. In contrast, non-
core ISPs have to use transit and pay for that. Milgrom, Mitchell and Srinagesh (1999)
use a non-cooperative bargaining framework to analyze the incentives of a core ISP to
enter into or refuse peering with another ISP. They hypothesize that in early stages of
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the Internet market development network size did not convey a major bargaining
advantage so that bill-and-keep arrangements would be likely outcomes independent
of relative sizes. In contrast, in the later stage, with increasing market penetration the
larger ISPs gain a bargaining advantage over smaller ones because their own
customers value outside communications less highly than before. Milgrom, Mitchell
and Srinagesh argue that the resulting peering arrangements (and the lack thereof) are
efficient, as long as there are enough core ISPs competing with each other.
3.2.2.2. Haring and Rohlfs, IEP 1997 (proposal for light regulation):
Haring and Rohlfs do an insightful analysis of costs saved by ILECs when
interconnecting with CLECs. This analysis calls for asymmetric pricing. As far as I
can see, there are two underlying reasons for this. The first is sunk costs. A large part
of the ILEC network represents sunk costs that cannot be saved. The second is the
relative size and coverage of the ILEC network compared to the CLEC network. A
CLEC with a small network provides less reciprocal services to an ILEC than a CLEC
with a large network. This second reason comes out clearest if both networks are in
place so that the sunk cost argument would cut both ways. The two networks would
still have to interconnect to realize the network externality.
Haring and Rohlfs suggest an approach to competition in local telecommunications
that would be substantially less regulatory than the current US policy. They suggest
that the ILEC get flexibility in their retail pricing and be allowed to price
interconnection and unbundled network elements at will, with the provision that the
CLEC prices interconnection symmetrically (at the same level). This suggestion
comes somewhat as a surprise after the authors’ cost analysis indicates that for most
types of unbundled services the ILEC’s costs are quite different from those of the
CLEC. At the same time, the authors argue that the ILECs would want to price these
services at cost because otherwise there would be inefficient bypass by the CLECs.
There is obviously one simple explanation for at least part of this apparent
contradiction. Having lower costs, ILECs would price these services at (or epsilon
below) CLEC costs. That is precisely what the CLECs are afraid of. In the very short
run, their costs are often infinite and in the short and medium run, their costs are still
quite much higher than the ILEC costs. Haring and Rohlfs also argue that CLECs
have large influence on the direction of traffic. Therefore, if ILECs set (symmetric)
interconnection charges too high, CLECs would induce ILECs to incur an access
charge deficit. This argument is obviously informed by the observation that CLECs in
fact seem to accumulate surpluses with ILECs.
Haring and Rohlfs point their finger at a possibly glaring gap in the US development,
and that is deregulation (or at least structural flexibility) of local retail prices charged
by ILECs. They see this step as a prerequisite for their suggestion of freely negotiated
interconnection agreements between ILECs and LECs with the proviso that prices are
symmetric in both directions.
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3.3. Regulatory approaches to negotiations
3.3.1. U.K. on negotiations between landline and cellular
Because fixed and mobile services are just beginning to compete with each other, two-
way access charges between landline and cellular networks pose problems somewhere
between those between international carriers and those between competing networks.
Armstrong (1997) discusses the UK process of finding termination charges between
landline and cellular networks. Under this process, the regulator only comes in if
private negotiations fail. Once the regulator is asked to do so, the yardstick is “fully
allocated costs”. Armstrong notes that this process has a drawback if a landline
network owns (or partially owns) the cellular network. In that case, privately agreed
termination charges may not be in the public interest, but the regulator is not asked to
interfere. Thus, pressure would have to come from other cellular operators.
3.4.  One-way and two-way access combined: Unbundled network
elements (UNEs)
As we have seen, in one-way access problems high access charges exclude
competitors, while in two-way access problems they can either hurt competitors or be
an instrument of collusion. Often, one-way and two-way access problems occur
between the same firms. This happens in the case of unbundled network elements
(UNEs). UNEs have been introduced by regulators in the US and some other countries
(Germany) as a tool to facilitate entry in the local exchange and complement partial
networks of entrants. They are controversial because their provision can be very
intrusive on incumbents and involve potentially high physical and transaction costs.
At the same time, they potentially help reduce wasteful duplication of facilities. While
the provision of UNEs can be justified under the essential facilities doctrine, the FCC
(1999) recently created “necessary” and “impair” standards. The “necessary” standard
requires that an entrant would be unable to offer a service without access to that
element, while under the “impair” standard the ability of the entrant to offer the
service without access to that element would only be materially diminished. Since the
“necessary” standard is stronger, the requirement of fulfilling this standard applies
even to proprietary UNEs (such as certain data bases) that an ILEC would not have to
supply under the “impair” standard.
3.4.1.  Laffont and Tirole (forthcoming)
UNEs, while helping entrants and being a means of regulatory and competition policy
(based on the essential facilities doctrine), therefore also have competition-reducing
effects. First, they reduce excess capacity that could lead to fierce competition.
Second, the price to be paid for UNEs is a cost to the entrant and a source of revenue
to the incumbent (Laffont and Tirole, forthcoming, Part V, Chapter 6). Thus, to the
extent that UNEs are profitable, they make the incumbent compete less for retail
customers. Incumbents, nevertheless, tend to oppose UNEs because they speed up
entry that otherwise could be delayed or avoided altogether and because price
regulation tends to make UNEs unprofitable.
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Entrants using UNEs often have their own networks (built partially or fully through
the UNEs). They therefore require the incumbent’s termination services and the
incumbent requires their termination services. As a result, UNEs represent a situation
with both one-way and two-way access. Because of scale economies, at least one of
the charges has to exceed marginal costs, in order to make the incumbent break even.
Both, the termination charge and the UNE charges could then be used as a
coordination device by the network providers. Laffont and Tirole (forthcoming, Part
V, Section 6) advise regulators to let termination charges be at or below marginal
costs and the UNE charge above marginal costs because low termination charges
preserve a level playing field without expropriating the incumbent. They recommend
a markup that takes care of the joint and common costs of the network (spread over
UNEs, including those imputed to the incumbent).
3.4.2. Farrell’s suggestion for deregulation of UNEs
Farrell (1997) suggests deregulating UNEs, once they are provided by more than one
firm. Thus, if the incumbent DO faces an entrant who duplicates a UNE, that
particular UNE would be offered under deregulated terms. Farrell does not define the
geographic scope of this deregulation. However, his arguments seem to imply that the
geographic scope would follow the alternatives that entrants without such UNEs
would have. The suggestion assures the entrant that he does not face competition from
an incumbent who is forced to offer that UNE at incremental costs. At the same time,
the incumbent DO has little incentive to hinder the entrant’s investment, since it opens
the door to deregulation. Farrell even believes that the incentives to invest could be
larger than optimal, because third entrants providing UNEs may not be profitable.
3.4.3. Noam’s deregulatory approach
Noam (forthcoming) suggests a highly deregulatory approach to access pricing. His
third party neutrality (TPN) framework gives the incumbent (or any other) carrier full
freedom to connect with other carriers or not. This includes charging any access price.
However Noam gives the incumbent’s subscribers a right (directly or indirectly) to
accept traffic from any other network. And, the prices for monopolistic bottleneck
segments, charged by the incumbent (or any other carrier), have to be piggy-backed on
competitive prices, by setting the price for monopolistic segments equal to the average
of competitive segments (adjusted for lower densities, etc.). While the TPN principle
itself may be weak in promoting competition, the piggybacking suggestion is
innovative and implementable.
4. Conclusions
This is a review of the state of the economic literature about interconnection. While
its focus is on telecommunications, the principles it reviews are more or less relevant
to other networks depending upon their particular characteristics. The review
considers only the pricing element of an interconnection contract, leaving aside other
issues such as risk sharing35, transactions costs and technological agreement. It does
                                                
35 For a discussion of aspects of risk bearing in interconnection contracts see Evans and Quigley (2000).
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not consider the direct or political economy costs of regulation. Even so, it reveals that
the pricing issues have not been solved.
It is apparent from the review that interconnection pricing can only be appraised in the
wider context of the regulation and competition of the market as a whole. For
example, the properties of the now-famous Baumol-Willig (ECPR) rule are different
when there is a retail price cap than without it.  It is critical for the special treatment of
interconnection contracts that there are natural monopoly elements in the network.
Where these are absent or bypass is economically viable interconnection contracts will
generally not pose special competition concerns.
The survey reviews the conceptual basis of proposed regulatory schemes and
measurement issues that arise in their use. In particular, it considers various price-cap
mechanisms. It does not review the empirical literature on industry and regulatory
performance under the different regulatory regimes.
Where there are natural monopoly elements, the review suggests that, for one-way
access, the two leading approaches to regulation appear to be price caps or access
price caps combined with deregulated retail tariffs. These approaches would include a
form of the Baumol-Willig rule. The review emphasises that two-way access is
characterized by both potential exclusion and potential collusion. It suggests that a
regulatory approach would seek to concentrate on keeping access charges low. Light-
handed regulation would then come in the form of deregulated retail tariffs. Taken
together, this suggests that, in a system with both one-way and two-way access, there
might be access price caps, possibly with two baskets, one for one-way access and one
for two-way access charges. At the same time, retail would be deregulated. In New
Zealand the regulatory price cap has been on household access.
As usual in economics, the academic literature on network access and interconnection
has concentrated on issues of optimal pricing. This survey reflects that emphasis.
Nevertheless, the pricing issues have not been solved. In the one-way access case, it
appears that the two most promising approaches to light-handed regulation are global
price caps or access price caps combined with deregulated retail tariffs. These
approaches would include the ECPR in the form of an imputation rule that would
prevent the dominant DO from using exclusionary practices. Since the two-way
access problem is characterized by both potential exclusion and potential collusion,
any regulatory approach will want to concentrate on keeping access charges low,
probably at or below marginal cost. Light-handed regulation would then come in the
form of deregulated retail tariffs. Taken together, this suggests that, in a system with
both one-way and two-way access problems, there should be access price caps,
possibly with two baskets, one for one-way access and one for two-way access
charges. At the same time, retail should be deregulated.
The literature surveyed on private negotiations is quite thin. It suggests that regulators
can step in as backups if private negotiations fail. This would allow regulators to
concentrate on contentious issues, while the “technical” issues would be resolved
privately. At the same time, L-R-T (1998) suggest that private negotiations could lead
to outcomes the regulator would not want.
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